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Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance
of Credit Rationing

Allen N. Berger
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Gregory F. Udell
New York University

This paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from
1977 to 1988. While commercial loan rates are "sticky," consistent
with rationing, this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways
that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory. In
addition, the proportion of new loans issued under commitment
does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight, despite
the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed
whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from
rationing. Overall, the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not
a significant macroeconomic phenomenon.

I.

Introduction

The subject of credit rationing is the focus of a considerable body of
theoretical analysis. One reason for this interest is the potentially
Most of the work on this paper was completed while Udell was a visiting economist
at the Federal Reserve Board. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those
of the Board of Governors or its staff. We would like to thank the editors and the
anonymous referee for guidance in rewriting the paper; Bob Avery, Mitch Berlin,
Charles Calomiris, Mark Carey, Lee Crabbe, Jean Dermine, Doug Diamond, John
Duca, George Fenn, Bruce Greenwald, Takeo Hoshi, Dick Ippolito, Jar! Kallberg, Anil
Kashyap, Loretta Mester, Don Morgan, Len Nakamura, Rich Rosen, Tony Saunders,
Steve Sharpe, Joe Stiglitz, Anjan Thakor, Paul Wachtel, and Arthur Warga for helpful
comments; and John Leusner, Peter Zemsky, and Bill Glahn for invaluable research
assistance.
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important role that credit rationing may play in the transmission of
monetary policy. Advocates of the availability doctrine in the 19505
suggested that monetary policy may operate in part through a rationing channel rather than an interest rate channel (e.g., Kareken
1957; Scott 1957). This early work on credit rationing depended on
ad hoc price rigidity arguments for its motivation. Later work by
Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrated
that credit rationing may persist in equilibrium using informationbased models. These papers spawned an entire generation of work
on credit rationing based on an information-theoretic approach (e.g.,
Blinder and Stiglitz 1983; Wette 1983; Besanko and Thakor 1987a,
1987b; Williamson 1987).
Despite these theoretical efforts, there remains little consensus
about whether credit rationing is an economically significant phenomenon. Riley (1987) argued that credit rationing in a Stiglitz-Weiss
environment would be limited to the marginal class of observably
distinct risk pools. Stiglitz and Weiss (1987) countered that Riley's
result was model-specific rather than general. Others have argued
that contractual mechanisms may be available that mitigate the rationing problem. These mechanisms include loan commitments (see
Boot and Thakor 1989; Sofianos, Wachtel, and Melnik 1990) and
collateral (see Bester 1985; Chan and Kanatas 1985; Besanko and
Thakor 1987b). Given the reasoned arguments on all sides of this
issue, it is clear that the significance or insignificance of credit rationing will have to be established empirically.
unfortunately, empirical tests of the extant theories of equilibrium
credit rationing have been difficult to conduct because of the paucity
of micro data on the contractual terms of commercial bank loans.
Nevertheless, some evidence has been generated on this issue using
macro data. Most of this research has exploited the fact that a key
testable implication of credit rationing is that the commercial loan
rate is "sticky"; that is, it does not fully respond to changes in openmarket rates. Often this research has focused on the speed with which
the loan rate acljusts to market rates. Goldfeld (1966) and Jaffee
(1971) found that the commercial loan rate was slow to adjust to
open-market rate changes. Slovin and Sushka (1983) later found that
the commercial loan rate was less "sticky" than in Goldfeld's or Jaffee's results and took this as evidence against the credit rationing
hypothesis, although their result may be subject to an alternative interpretation. I Using a different approach, King (1986, p. 298) found
1 Slovin and Sushka regressed the average commercial loan interest rate on the
contemporaneous value and two quarterly lags of the commercial paper rate, using
nine different specifications of other variables (their table 1, p. 1590). The coefficient
of the second lag term was statistically significant at the 1 percent level in six of nine
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"mixed support" for the credit rationing hypothesis. Sofianos et al.
(1990) used time-series techniques and found evidence consistent
with credit rationing, but only for loans funded without commitments. As discussed below, however, their results may also be subject
to an alternative interpretation.
This paper differs from previous empirical work on credit rationing of commercial loans in that individual loan data, rather than
macro data, are employed. The micro data approach permits us to
analyze the empirical implications of rationing models that relate to
specific features of bank loan contracts and to examine the behavior
of the commercial loan market at the individual loan level. The Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Bank Lending data set contains
contract information on over 1,000,000 commercial loans made from
1977 to 1988. 2
Consistent with previous studies, we find evidence ofloan rate stickiness. In contrast to previous studies, however, we do not assume that
this necessarily reflects credit rationing. While sticky loan pricing is
consistent with the rationing hypothesis, it is not by itself sufficient
evidence of it. One alternative explanation is that banks may offer
implicit interest rate insurance to risk-averse repeat borrowers in the
form of below-market rates during periods of high market rates, for
which the banks are later compensated when market rates are low
(see Fried and Howitt 1980). Another possibility is that stickiness may
be the result of loan recontracting between banks and companies
experiencing financial distress when market interest rates are high.
To avoid bankruptcy costs, banks may be willing to renegotiate and
grant new loans at concessionary rates to such companies at these
times (see Sharpe 1991).
In this paper, we develop a number of empirical tests that are
capable of differentiating credit rationing from alternative explanations of price stickiness in commercial lending. We examine how loan
rate stickiness varies across several loan contract features that may be
related to rationing behavior. In addition, a more direct and definitive test of the quantitative effects of rationing focuses on the proporcases. They concluded that "movements in interest rates are fully and quickly transmitted to commercial loan customers" (p. 1595), but an alternative conclusion is that the
transmission mechanism takes at least two quarters and perhaps more.
2 There have also been a number of studies of credit rationing in the mortgage
market. Duca and Rosenthal (1991) examined the behavior of the ratio of Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages to total mortgages in the "post-disintermediation era," arguing that FHA mortgages are less vulnerable to rationing because
they are government guaranteed. They found evidence of "default-risk induced" rationing in the form of a positive relationship between FHA market share and the
spread of AAA- over A-rated corporate bonds. See also Jaffee and Rosen (1979),
Hendershott (1980), and Rosen and Rosen (1980).
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tion of new loans that are issued under commitment. If rationing
were widespread, this proportion would necessarily increase when
credit markets are tight because borrowers without commitments can
be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data and
the tests to be performed, and Section III gives the empirical results
of those tests. Section IV presents conclusions.

II.

Data and Test Descriptions

Our primary data source is the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms
of Bank Lending. Each quarter from 1977: 1 to 1988: 2, approximately 340 banks listed the individual characteristics of every domestic commercial and industrial loan and construction and land development loan made during one or more days of the first week of the
second month of the quarter. The sample includes the 48 largest
banks in the nation in terms of commercial and industrial lending
plus 292 other banks chosen to represent the strata of smaller banks.
Banks that withdrew from the sample were replaced with banks of
similar size and other characteristics. In all, 460 different banks are
represented in the sample.
Table 1 gives a description of each variable, as well as its sample
mean, standard deviation, and number of independent observations. 3
The data set is quite large, with 1,103,933 independent observations
on the terms of individual loans taken from 460 different banks and
46 time periods. The bank and macro variables, which have fewer
independent observations, were allocated to their corresponding loan
observations.
Tests of Loan Rate Stickiness

The "stickiness tests" involve regressing the loan rate premium
(PREM) against measures of real or nominal rates, the key loan contract variables, and a number of control variables for characteristics
of the loan contract, the issuing bank, and the macro environment.
For fixed-rate loans, PREM is the annualized (nominal) loan interest
rate less the (nominal) rate on a Treasury security of comparable
duration. For floating-rate loans, we ideally would subtract the Treasury rate with duration equal to the expected repricing interval, but
this cannot be precisely determined from the data. As an approxima3 A small number of loans (fewer than I percent) were deleted because of data
problems. See Berger and Udell (1989) for details.
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tion, we assume that all floating rate loans are expected to be repriced
within 4 weeks and use the Treasury rate with duration equal to the
minimum of the loan duration and 4 weeks. 4
The primary exogenous variables are the comparable Treasury
rate for each loan (TRA TE) and its square (TRATE2), which measure open-market rates and summarize credit market conditions relevant to rationing. Note that the use of PREM and the TRATE variables allows for nonlinearities in the term structure of interest rates,
which would not be the case if the loan rate were used instead as the
dependent variable and a single representative Treasury rate and
the loan duration were included as regressors. A second measure of
credit market tightness is the dummy variable CRUNCH, which takes
on the value one for quarters in which Eckstein and Sinai (1986)
determined that a credit crunch was operative. This variable allows
for additional nonlinear effects of credit market conditions and allows
us to focus particularly on the time periods in which rationing may
have been most likely to occur:"
The analysis was conducted using both real and nominal interest
rates as exogenous variables, denoted by TRATER and TRATEN,
respectively. This represents a break from the empirical literature,
which generally considers only nominal rates. Note that the dependent variable PREM does not depend on real versus nominal considerations, since it is the difference between two rates of the same duration. The use of the real rate (TRATER) more closely corresponds
with the theoretical literature on credit rationing, which essentially
describes a real phenomenon. Unfortunately, use of the real rate
suffers in practice because inflationary expectations are unknown. In
estimating inflationary expectations, we tried models of both rational
and adaptive expectations as well as the Livingston Survey data. Since
the results were similar across approaches, we simply report the results from using the Livingston data here. Use of the nominal rate
(TRATEN) has the virtue of largely avoiding mismeasurement problems, but it may fail to capture effectively the changes in credit market
tightness. However, to the extent that some economic agents react to
4 For the 4-week rate, we used the average of the bid-asked spread in the secondary
Treasury bill market. The other Treasury data used were new issue (when available)
or secondary market quotes of 3- 6-, and 12-month bills and 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and
30-year bonds and notes. Durations were computed for these maturities, and the rates
for all other durations were determined by interpolation and extrapolation. A number
of other methods of computing the risk premia on floating-rate loans were tried, but
the reported results were not qualitatively altered.
5 Eckstein and Sinai defined credit crunches as "periods when financial distress produces sharp discontinuities in flow of funds and spending and when the financial
strains include tight monetary policy, much lessened availability of money and credit,
sharp rises of interest rates, and deteriorating balance sheets for households, businesses, and financial institutions" (p. 41).
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TABLE 1
DATA USED IN REGRESSIONS

.

~....::=;;;-:==~:::::.'.. ===-~ .::-==-:-~=---==------==...----

----...::..=--.::::::.---

==---==--=-==----

---"~--::::::-:::--:--.::-~=:==:::::.=---- ..

Mean

Standard
Deviation
----_._, --.- ._------

PREM
TRATER
TRATEN
CRUNCH
COMMIT
FLOAT
COLI-AI'

Annualized loan interest rate minus the rate for a Treasury seClirity of equal duration, except that floating-rate loans over 4
weeks use the 4-week Treasury rate
Real interest rate on a comparable Treasury security for the individual loan (as in PREM), calculated using the Livingston Survey of intlationary expectations
Nominal interest rate on a comparable Treasury security for the
individual loan (as in PREM)
Equals one for quarters in which a credit crunch was operative,
using Eckstein and Sinai (1986): 1978:2-1980:1, 1981:11981:4
Equals one if the loan is under commitment
Equals one if the loan is floating-rate
Equals one if the loan is secured (collateralized)

Number of
Independent
Observations

-~----.--------.-

.0419

.0217

1,103,933

.0247

.0259

1,103,933

.0861

.0332

1.103,9~~3

.2524

.4344

46

.5305
.6lf>2
.5760

.4991
.4866
.4941

1,103,933
1,103,933
1,103,933

SIZE
DURATION
DEMAND
OVERNIGHT
SINGFAM
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MULTIFAM
NON RES

....
0

(,}l
(.>0

LNBANKASSETS
GNPGROWTH
UNEMPLOY
TIME
BANKDUMMIES

Real size of the loan (LNSIZE = 10g[SIZEj used in regressions)
Duration of the loan in years; the present-value weights use the
initial loan interest rate (LNDURATION = 10g[DURATIONj
used in the regressions)
Equals one if the loan has no stated maturity (i.e., a demand
note)
Equals one if the loan is a I-day (i.e., overnight) loan; set to zero
prior to August 1982, when day of month maturities became
available
Equals one for a single-family construction and development
loan
Equals one for a multifamily construction and development loan
Equals one for a nonresidential construction and development
loan
Natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank
Real GNP growth over the previous quarter (%)
Unemployment rate (%)
Time trend for the 46 dates (1, ... ,46)
Dummies for all sample banks were included in every regression

NOIT.-All dollar figures are constant 1987 dollars except as noted.

559.4 E3
.4106

369.1 E4
.6785

1,103,933
1,103,933

.2618

.4396

1,103,933

.0126

.1113

599,387

.0455

.2084

1,103,933

.0070
.0270

.0831
.1622

1,103,933
1,103,933

15.1198
.7630
7.2077
24.3343

1.6985
1.0120
1.2826
13.6733

6,293
46
46
46
460
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changes in nominal prices because of nominal price stickiness in output or factor markets or because of difficulties in contracting in real
rates, nominal rate stickiness may still be indicative of credit rationing.
In contrast to some of the empirical literature (e.g., Goldfe1d 1966;
Jaffee 1971; Slovin and Sushka 1983), we use only contemporaneous
open-market interest rates and do not include lags. In our opinion,
this provides a cleaner test ofthe Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) models of equilibrium credit rationing. These are
one-period models of lender responses to current credit market conditions. Therefore, the current comparable Treasury rate for the loan
and its square seem to be good summary statistics for the conditions
relevant to the setting of rates and rationing policies on newl)' issued
loans. Thus the model tests whether, in equilibrium, banks raise loan
rates equally with increases in risk-free open-market rates or whether
they ration loan funds, not how long it takes to reach equilibrium.
In some of the regression models, the credit market tightness variables TRATE and CRUNCH are interacted with three key contract
variables, COMMIT, COLLAT, and FLOAT, in order to determine
whether loans with different contract terms exhibit different degrees
of stickiness. Under a loan commitment contract, the lender agrees
to extend credit at the borrower's request up to some prespecified
amount over a given time period. Commitments explicitly provide
insurance against credit rationing because they preclude the bank
from denying a funding request on the basis of general market conditions (see Melnik and Plaut 1986; Sofianos et al. 1990).5 Indeed, a
recent loan officer survey (Board of Governors 1988) indicated that
"protection against credit crunches" ranked only behind minimizing
transactions costs as a motivation for commitments. Therefore, any
observed stickiness on commitment loans cannot reflect credit rationing of commitment borrowers, since they are contractually insulated from rationing.
The difference in stickiness between commitment and noncommitment loan rates may also reflect the difference in relative magnitudes
of information problems between commitment and noncommitment
borrowers and in the power of micro contracting to solve these problems. A study of loan commitments found commitment loans to be
safer on average than noncommitment loans, suggesting that commitment borrowers may have fewer than average information problems
6 Many commitments have escape clauses that permit the lender to abrogate the
contract in the event that the borrower's condition has suffered "material adverse
change." These clauses by necessity are triggered by changes in the observable quality
of the borrower. Therefore, commitments with escape clauses still provide insurance
against Stiglitz and Weiss-type rationing, which is driven by unobservable differences
in borrower quality.
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(see Avery and Berger 1991), although in some tangentially related
research, commitments are not negatively related to all the risk measures (see Berger and Udell 1990, 1992). The nature of the commitment contract or the commitment selection process might also attenuate the kinds of information problems that have typically been
associated with credit rationing (see Boot, Thakor, and Udell 1987;
Kanatas 1987; Thakor and Udell 1987; Berkovitch and Greenbaum
1991). Thus if information problems are creating the stickiness, it is
likely that commitment loan rates would be less sticky, reflecting
fewer information problems for commitment borrowers or the attenuation of these problems by the commitments.
Collateral has been found to be associated with higher risk and
therefore may be associated with more information problems and
loan rate stickiness (see Berger and Udell 1990). However, the pledging of collateral can also mitigate information problems, reducing
the associated stickiness (see Bester 1985; Chan and Kanatas 1985;
Besanko and Thakor 1987a, 1987b). Thus rates on secured loans may
be more or less sticky than unsecured loans. Finally, floating-rate
loans may have a different degree of stickiness than fixed-rate loans
because of any sorting associated with the degree of fixity in rate
repricing or differences related to the sharing of interest rate risk.
Tests of the Proportions of Loans with Different
Contract Features

The "proportions tests" examine the testable implications of credit
rationing that relate to how the proportions of new loans with different contract features vary with credit market tightness. The methodology is to form logit models of the probabilities that one dollar being
lent for 1 year will (i) be under commitment, (ii) be secured, or (iii) be
floating rate. Computing limitations rule out the possibility of using
observation-by-observation logit estimations, so grouped logit models
were formed by combining the loans made by a given bank at a given
time. For every variable for which data were available by individual
loan, a weighted average across all the loans for the bank-date combination was formed, with the weights being proportional to the size
and duration of the individual loans. In this way, each loan is represented in proportion to its contribution to the bank's future loan
portfolio. 7 The dependent variables were also transformed into logodds ratio form In[Y/(1 - Y)], where Y is the size-duration weighted
proportion of new loans with the characteristic being examined (e.g.,
7 For example, a $5,000 loan with 2 years' duration receives 10 times the weight of
a $1,000, I-year loan.
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COMMIT). This form preserves the functional relationship of the
observation-by-observation logit form but loses some information by
averaging. Each regression was estimated by weighted least squares
to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. 8
The COMMIT proportions test provides a relatively direct and
definitive test of the quantitative significance of credit rationing. If
credit rationing is economically important, then the proportion of
new bank loans made under commitment must increase substantially
with open-market rates and credit market tightness. Simply put, rationing decreases the quantity of noncommitment lending from what
it otherwise would have been but cannot reduce the quantity of commitment lending because of contractual constraints. 9 Two other factors related to information problems may also induce a positive relationship between open-market rates and the commitment proportion
even if no rationing actually occurs: (i) borrowers may avoid rationing
by switching funding from noncommitment sources to existing commitment lines (if not deterred by commitment covenants) or (ii) more
borrowers may purchase commitment contracts when the probability
of being rationed is increased. lo It follows that a virtual necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for rationing to be an important macroeconomic phenomenon is that the proportion of new loans made
under commitment increases substantially when open-market interest
rates rise.
The COLLAT and FLOAT proportions tests are intended to reveal
the extent to which rationing, if it occurs, affects borrowers with
different contract terms differently. For instance, how the COLLAT
proportion reacts to changes in open-market interest rates may reveal
the net effect of (i) the difference in information problems for secured versus unsecured borrowers, (ii) the extent to which collateral
arrangements solve these problems, and (iii) the extent to which borEach observation was divided by the estimated standard deviation of its error term,
+ [If(1 - Y)J}/n)1/2, where n is the sum of the size-duration weights for all the
loans embodied in the bank-date observation.
9 The only case in which rationing would not be reflected in the proportion of loans
made under commitment would occur if rationing were demand-induced and the
increased demand came only from noncommitment borrowers. In this case, there
would be excess demand for noncommitment loans, but the quantities of both commitment and noncommitment loans would remain constant. Although possible, this case
seems quite unlikely. Increases in aggregate demand are generally associated with
increased funding under working capital commitment lines to finance inventory replenishment, so that, if anything, the commitment proportion would increase.
10 This latter argument assumes that there are some fixed costs associated with issuing commitments that do not generally increase with the probability of takedown. An
example might be the expected costs associated with the difficulty of writing a "material
adverse change clause" that adequately protects the bank against borrower credit deterioration. Without fixed costs, risk-averse borrowers would always purchase commitments from risk-neutral banks.
8

({(IfY)
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rowers who do not pledge collateral when rates are low may pledge
collateral when rates are high to avoid rationing.
Both the stickiness and the proportions regressions include a number of additional loan-specific, macro, and bank variables as control
variables. The loan-specific contract variable LNSIZE accounts for
the possibility of scale economies in lending and the possibility that
loan size may also be associated with credit risk; LNDURATION
accounts for the possibility of a nonrisk term premium component
of the dependent variable or another scale economy in lending; DEMAND accounts for differences in risk created by the bank's option
to call a loan and any sorting effects related to this option. The
OVERNIGHT, SINGFAM, MULTIFAM, and NONRES variables
are exogenous factors that may provide information about the type
of borrower or loan. The macro variables, GNPGROWTH, UNEMPLOY, TIME, and the square of TIME, are included to control for
the effects of non-credit market cycles, changes in aggregate risk,
and other trends that may be correlated with credit market conditions. The bank variable LNBANKASSETS is included to account
for the possibility of segmented markets in which different-sized
banks have access to different types of borrowers. Finally, every regression contains dummy variables for every bank in the sample to
control for systematic differences in pricing caused by the presence
of other pricing elements (e.g., up-front fees or compensating balances), as well as differences in regulatory and competitive environments across banks. The use of the individual bank dummies essentially provides the strongest set of controls for any type of stable bank
differences that can be specified.

III.

Empirical Results

Stickiness Test Results

Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the stickiness tests. The loan rate
premia (PREM) are regressed on real and nominal rates, respectively,
as well as loan contract terms and macro and bank control variables,
although the coefficients of the control variables are not shown here
(see Berger and Udell [1989J for these coefficients). All coefficients
and derived statistics (including the coefficients of the control variables) are statistically significant because of the unusually large number of observations. The regression shown in column 1 of table 2 has
as regressors the real Treasury rate appropriate for the individual
loan (TRATER) and its square (TRATER2), but excludes CRUNCH
and any interaction terms. The individual coefficients of TRATER
and TRATER2 are difficult to interpret because the variables move

Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.

TABLE 2
Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.

REGRESSIONS OF LOAN RATE PREMIA (PREM) ON REAL INTEREST RATES, LOAN CONTRACT TERMS, AND CONTROL VARIABLES

_==:__
I-

Coefficicnt

Statistic

I-

Coefficient

Statistic

--_.-._-_._----

---_._----

....
0

(J1

00

---------

---------, ..._---

TRATER
TRATER2
CRUNCH
TR-COM-FLOA T
TR-COM-FIXED
TR-NOCOM-FLOAT
TR-COL-FLOA T
TR-COL-FIXED
TR-NOCOL-FLOAT
CR-COM-FLOAT
CR-COM-FIXED
CR-NOCOM-Fl.OA T
CR-COL-FLOAT
CR-COL-FIXEU
CR-NOCOL-FLOAT

- .4912**
3.4176**

COMMIT
COLLAT
FLOAT
C;OM-FLOA'r
COM-FIXED
NOC;OM-FLOA'I'
COL-FLOA'l'
COL-FIXED

-.0030**
9.9E -4**
.00SI**

------

-239.3
150.7

-

Cocfficient
-

(2)

(I)

Variable

-~-

..

-------

(3)

tStatistic

Coefficicnt
.

'cc==.--=-=
tCoefficicnt Statistic
.,--=:.~-=:=

--"'--~--

(4)

(5)

.. -

- .5973**
3.6801**

-249.0
161.5

.1289**
.0379**
.1436**

76.7
17.2
75.9

- .6452**
3.8687**
-2.2E-4*
.1089**
.0288**
.1292*'

.0112**
.0060**
.0085**

-71.1
25.0
17S.1

tStatistic

-259.8
169.4
-2 ..0
64.2
13.1
67.9

-.5392**
3.6795**

-220.5
162.0

- .5930**
3.8555**
.0044**

-234.9
169.5
-46.2

.0740**
- .1062*'
.0842**

41.6
-52.9
43.1

.0694**
-.0971**
.0633**

38.7
-48.5
32.1

.0043**
- .0066**
.0074**

39.1
-57,2
60.9

-76.1

- .0031 **

-74.1

86.3

.00:) 1**
.0026*'

64.5
31.0

107.8
46.9
73.5

-.0032'*
.0011**

27.S

.0010**

25.9

.0015**
.0013**
.0040*'

20.8
-50.7
5:1.0

- .0016**
-.0062*'
.0012**

-20.6
68.4
15.4
.0061**
6.7E-4**

8.8

NOCOL-FLOAT
R2

.28

.28

.0030**
.29

.29

38.0

.0014**
.30

16.5

Simulated Effects of an Increase in Credit Market Tightness:
Predicted Change in PREM and t-Statistic from a Doubling of TRATER from Its Mean (.02472) for Different Categories of Loans
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COM- or COLFLOAT LOANS
COM-ORCOLFIXED LOANS
NOCOM-OR
NOCOL-FLOAT LNS
NOCOM-OR
NOCOL-FIXED LNS

-.0059**

-249.6

- .0048**

-149.8

-.0062**

-182.3

-.0048**

-145.2

- .0059**

- 171.7

-.0071**

-142.0

-.0081**

-160.4

-.0092**

-218.2

-.0100**

-230.3

-.0045**

-116.2

-.0057**

-140.9

- .0045**

-120.8

-.0060**

- 153.7

-.0080**

-228.1

-.0089**

-240.9

- .0066**

-173.6

-.0076**

-192.8

Predicted Change in PREM and t-Statistic from a Credit Crunch (CRUNCH) for Different Categories of Loans

....

0

(,)1

<.0

COM-ORCOLFLOAT LOANS
COM-ORCOLFIXED LOANS
NOCOM-OR
NOCOL-FLOAT LNS
NOCOM-OR
NOCOL-FIXED LNS

.0109**

117.4

.0086**

93.5

.0058**

48.1

-.0023**

-22.8

.0082**

77.5

.0117**

1l0.5

-2.2E-4*

-2.5

.0044**

46.2

Non;,-Each observation represents the terms of an individual loan contract. Number of observations is 1,103,933. Intercepts were included for each bank in the sample, and the R2 ,s reflect
the proportion of variance explained after these intercepts. Also included but not shown are the control variables LNSIZE, LNDURATION, DEMAND, OVERNIGHT, SINGFAM, MULTIF AM,
NONRES, LNBANKASSETS, GNPGROWTH, UNEMPLOY, TIME, and TIME2.

* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level,

two-sided.

** Statistically Significant at the 1 percent level, two-sided.
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TABLE 3
REGRESSIONS OF LOAN RATE PREMIA (PREM) ON NOMINAL INTEREST RATES, LOAN CONTRACT TERMS, AND CONTROL VARIABLES
-.-.:;~~-::::~- -=--.:=:-==-----;;:~==

t-

Coefficient
Variable

Statistic

t-

Coefficient

Statistic

Coefficient

Statistic

t-

Coefficient
(4)

(3)

t-

Statistic

--

(2)

(I)

t-

-----------

...
0

Ol

0

TRATEN
TRATEN2
CRUNCH
TR-COM-FLOA T
TR-COM-FIXED
TR-NOCOM-FLOAT
TR-COL-FLOAT
TR-COL-FIXED
TR-NOCOL-FLOA'I'
CR-COM-FLOAr
CR-COM-FIXED
CR-NOCOM-FLOAT
CR-COL-FLOAT
CR-COL-FIXED
CR-NOCOL-FLOAT
COMMIT
COLLAT
FLOAT
COM-FLOAT
COM-FIXED
NOCOM-FLOAT
COL-FLOAT

- .2619**
.5819**

-55.1
29.8

- .4486*'
.8520*'

-90.7
43.9

.1834**
.0946**
.1778**

131.8
51.2
113.9

- .4262**
.7787**
-.0012**
.1129*'
.0699**
.1550*'

.0065**
.0010*'
.0037**

9.1E-4**
.0088**

-67.8
22.4
186.9

-85.9
40.0
-12.6
89.3
33.8
86.0

.- .0113**
·-.OI2:F*
.. 0082**

23.H
- 80.5
-68.5
-53.0

H.9E-1**
-.. 0096**
-.OIH**
- .0075**

Statistic

(5)
-"-----_ .. _-

-.3437**
.7624**

-69.8
39.4

- .3399**
.6945**
.0016*'

-68.7
35.8
16.0

.0865**
- .1296**
.1167**

59.1
-76.8
73.3

.0775*'
- .1046'*
.0898**

46.1
-55.4
18.4

.0015**
-.0039**
.0010**

1!.7
-29.2
28.0

72.6

- .0030*'

-71.1

6.7

.0013"

53.5
26.9
27.5

-- .0()3 1**
9.6E-4**

---~

Coefficient

22.2
-66.1
-62.5
-46.7
9.8E-1··

8.8

COL-FIXED
NOCOL-FLOAT
R2

.24

.0094**
- .0049**
.26

.26

.25

57.1
- 30.S

.00S4**
- .0035**
.26

50.2
-21.3

Simulated Effects of an Increase in Credit Market Tightness:
Predicted Change in PREM and t-Statistic from Increasing TRATEN from Its Mean (.08608)
by .02472 for Different Categories of Loans
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COM- or COLFLOAT LOANS
COM-OR COLFIXED LOANS
NOCOM-OR
NOCOL-FLOAT LNS
NOCOM-OR
NOCOL-FIXED LNS

-68.7

- .0032**

-84.0

- .0026**

-75.6

-.0031**

-81.2

-.0046**

-96.6

-.0050**

-97.2

-.0080*·

-185.5

-.0076**

-165.6

-.0025**

-65.S

-.0029**

-67.3

-.0019**

-49.8

-.0028**

-65.5

-.0069**

-179.4

-.0067**

-165.4

-.0048**

-119.7

-.0050**

-1lS.1

Predicted Change in PREM and I-Statistic from a Credit Crunch (CRUNCH) for Different Categories of Loans

.....

o

01
.....

-120.1

-.0037**

- .0024**

COM-ORCOLFLOAT LOANS
COM-ORCOLFIXED LOANS
NOCOM-OR
NOCOL-FLOAT LNS
NOCOM-OR
NOCOL-FIXED LNS
NOTE.-See note to table 2.

** Statistically significant at the

1 percent level,

two~sided.

.0053**

50.9

.0031 **

30.6

.0028**

20.6

-.0022**

-20.2

.0025**

20.8

.0056**

46.3

-.0012**

-12.6

.0016**

16.0
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together, but their coefficients have opposite signs. To obtain a more
meaningful summary statistic that measures the effects of a tightening of the credit market, we computed the predicted change in
PREM that would be caused by a doubling of TRATER from its mean
(i.e., from 2.472 percent to 4.944 percent). The predicted change
and its t-statistic are shown in column 1 of the bottom section of the
table. The - .0059 predicted change suggests that when real rates
double, the premium over the risk-free rate drops 59 basis points. II
This represents a substantial degree of stickiness in loan rates when
compared to the historical average bank return on assets, which is
less than 100 basis points. The elasticity of PREM with respect to
TRA TER evaluated at the sample mean is also substantial, - .19.
The regression shown in column 1 of table 3 repeats the experiment using nominal Treasury rates (TRA TEl'\, TRA TEN2) in place
of the real rates. When nominal rates are increased by the same
amount as the real rates (2.472 percent), the measured stickiness is
somewhat less, 37 basis points. This becomes much larger, 99 basis
points (not shown), if nominal rates are instead doubled from their
relatively large sample mean value (8.608 percent). We consider the
lesser of these two increases to be more reliable, since twice the mean
nominal rate is well above the dense part of the TRA TEN distribution. The elasticity of PREM with respect to the nominal rate evaluated at the mean is - .34, which exceeds (in absolute value) the real
rate elasticity because of the larger mean of TRA TEI'\. 12
Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the loan rate premia
and Treasury rates over time. The solid lines in the figure connect
the size-duration weighted averages of PREM across all loans for
each time period; the broken lines connect the weighted averages of
TRATER in figure la and TRATEN in figure lb. As shown, PREM
is very highly negatively correlated with both real and nominal rates
over the period from about 1979: 4 to 1982 : 4 but is not highly related
for the remainder of the sample. During this period, rates were at
highs relative to the recent past, then fell and rose again to their
sample peaks. The strong negative relationship during this period is
consistent with credit rationing but is also consistent with the alternative theories of rate stickiness.
By construction, the stickiness illustrated thus far is the same for
II The formula for this change is (2f.l f.l)~1 + [(2f.l)2 - f.l21~2' where f.l is the
sample mean of TRA TE and ~I and ~2 are the coefficients of TRA TE and TRA TE2,
respectively.
12 Kote that the stickiness results would be essentially unchanged if the second-order
terms (TRATE2) were not included in the regressions. Excluding these terms gives
measured drops in PREM from changing TRA TE of 53, 31, and 107 basis points in
place of the reported 59, 37, and 99 basis points, respectively.
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I.-Bank loan premia and Treasury rates of the same duration (1977:1-

1988:2): a, real Treasury rates; b, nominal Treasury rates.

all types of loans since TRATE was not interacted with any other
variables in the regressions. However, as discussed above, most of the
interesting testable implications apply to relative stickiness, which we
turn to next. The regression shown in column 2 of table 2 reproduces
tht; regression in column 1 but allows stickiness to differ across loans
in four categories of commitment and floating-rate status. The
dummy variables COMMIT and FLOAT are replaced by three interaction terms, COM-FLOAT, COM-FIXED, and NOCOM-FLOAT,
and these variables are interacted with TRATE, denoted by TR-
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COM-FLOAT, TR-COM-FIXED, and TR-1\OCOM-FLOAT. This
allows the four commitment-rate type combinations (including the
unspecified category NOCOM-FIXED) to have independent degrees
of stickiness. The results in column 2 suggest that all four categories
of loans have sticky rates. When real rates are doubled, commitment
loans have roughly the same stickiness as noncommitment loans for
a given rate type (48 vs. 45 basis points for floating-rate and 71 vs.
80 basis points for fixed-rate), but floating-rate loans are substantially
less sticky than fixed-rate loans for a given commitment status (48
vs. 71 basis points for commitment and 45 vs. 80 basis points for
noncommitment). Column 3 replicates column 2 but adds the variable
CRUNCH and its interactions with the other variables as well. The
results show that during periods designated as credit crunches, the
PREM actually increased for three of the four categories, contrary to
the expectation under credit rationing that premia would be lower
during credit crunches. In addition, an interaction term between
TRATER and CRUNCH added to the regression (not shown) had a
positive coefficient, suggesting that the responsiveness of loan rates
to open-market rates is greater during credit crunches, again contrary
to expectations if borrowers are rationed during crunches. These
findings suggest either that the observed stickiness in the other regressions is largely unrelated to credit rationing or that the EcksteinSinai credit crunches do not correspond well with rationing periods. 13
The results for nominal rates shown in the corresponding columns
in table 3 largely replicate those in table 2, with the exception that
commitment loans display somewhat less stickiness than noncom mitment loans.
The finding that stickiness on commitment loans is substantial and
is nearly the same as that on noncommitment loans of the same rate
type suggests that the empirical literature that equated stickiness with
credit rationing may be misleading. A large portion of all rate stickiness is accounted for by commitment loans and cannot be associated
with credit rationing because commitment contracts preclude rationing. In addition, if the stickiness is caused by Stiglitz and Weiss-type
information problems, we would expect rates on commitment loans to
be less sticky than those on noncommitment loans, given the empirical
results cited earlier and corroborated here that commitments are associated with higher than average quality borrowers who likely have
relatively few information problems. 14 Therefore, the finding of
13 One possible nonrationing explanation for the positive relationship between loan
rate premia and CRUNCH is that CRUNCH may be coincident with periods of increased aggregate risk and, therefore, higher risk premia on bank loans.
14 The rate premium is lower on commitment loans, ceteris paribus. by 30 basis
points when the regression in col. I of table 2 is used, suggesting less compensation
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near-equality of stickiness between commitment and noncommitment
loan rates suggests that information problems are not the dominant
reasons for rate stickiness.
The finding that stickiness is much more prevalent on fixed-rate
than floating-rate loans has no direct implications for credit rationing
but may be consistent with an alternative hypothesis. If lenders provide implicit interest rate insurance, this result suggests that they do
so through fixed-rate loan contracts that insulate the borrowers from
rate variation over the life of the contract. 15
The results shown in columns 4 and 5 of tables 2 and 3 replicate the
models shown in columns 2 and 3, respectively, except that COLLAT
replaces COMMIT in all the interaction terms. The results again
show that rates on fixed-rate loans are stickier than those on floatingrate loans. They also again show that stickiness is generally less during
CRUNCH periods, contrary to the predictions of the extant theories
of credit rationing. The new result is that secured loans exhibit more
rate stickiness than other loans with the same floating- or fixed-rate
status in most cases, although the difference is often slight. 16 If information problems are driving the rate stickiness, then the slightly
greater stickiness of secured loan rates suggests that borrowers who
pledge collateral have more information problems than other borrowers (consistent with their greater risk discussed above) and that
the process of pledging collateral does not fully offset these problems.
We also reran the main regressions using rates of growth of aggregate loans in place of the TRA TE variables as alternative measures
of credit market tightness (not shown). The results suggested that
increasing credit tightness by reducing loan growth from its mean to
zero actually results in slightly higher loan rate premia, contrary to
the implications of credit rationing. The fact that loan rate premia
do not consistently decline with alternative measures of credit market
tightness (CRUNCH and reduced loan growth) suggests that rationing does not play an important role during periods of overall
credit market tightness. This makes it more difficult to argue that
credit rationing is an important macroeconomic phenomenon.
The stickiness data may also be used to examine Riley's (1987)
version of credit rationing, which suggests that rationing would be
for risk on commitment loans, consistent with Avery and Berger (1991). Similar results
hold when the other regressions are used.
15 Some of the observed stickiness on fixed·rate loans may occur because the rates
have been locked in by fixed-rate commitment contracts issued in the past. Unfortunately, this cannot be determined from the data, which have information on whether
the loan is fixed-rate, but not on whether the commitment is fixed-rate.
16 This comes from comparing the effects of COL-FLOAT with NOCOL-FLOAT
and COL-FIXED with NOCOL-FIXED.
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substantial only for the marginal class of observably distinct risk pools.
If differences across rate premia at a given time largely reflect risk
differentials, then the stickiness results shown in tables 2 and 3 would
hold primarily for the loans with the highest premia (i.e., highest
risk) under Riley's hypothesis. To examine this possibility, the data
were ordered by PREM for each time period, separated into quintiles,
and grouped with data from the same quintiles from all the other
time periods. Rerunning the regressions separately for each quintile
group showed that the stickiness prevailed over all five quintiles.
When a difference appeared, the most stickiness was observed in the
lowest-premium (i.e., safest) quintile and the least stickiness in the
highest (i.e., riskiest) quintile. These results run contrary to the predictions of Riley's model. They also provide a robustness check of the
main stickiness results, which prevail across different premia levels.
One final insight from the stickiness analysis comes from examination of the raw data on PREM. The data reveal that banks at times
extend loans with interest rates below the comparable risk-free rate.
To investigate this, we identify loans for which the rate is at least 1
percent below the comparable risk-free rate (i.e., PREM < - .01) to
guard against overmeasuring negative premia lending. While these
negative-premium loans are only 1.0 percent of the entire sample,
their proportion varies directly with the interest rate cycle. They
peaked at 7.0 percent of the sample when open-market rates were at
their peak in 1982: 2, more than 70 times as high as in the mid
to late 1980s when open-market rates were substantially lower. The
incidence of negative-premia loans is also more than 10 times as great
on fixed-rate loans as on floating-rate loans, 2.3 percent versus 0.2
percent, respectively. These data are not consistent with extant theories of credit rationing, which require that banks earn a nonnegative
expected economic profit on each loan by charging a rate sufficiently
above the risk-free rate to compensate for expected credit losses.
However, lending at a negative premium is consistent with other
explanations of stickiness that recognize long-term lending relationships, such as implicit interest rate insurance or recontracting with
financially distressed borrowers.
Overall, the stickiness results suggest that the empirical literature
that equated stickiness with credit rationing may have been misleading because of the lack of available information on specific loan
contract terms. With the notable exception of some of the collateral
results, the data generally do not support the currently available theories of credit rationing as the dominant explanations of the stickiness.
Nearly half of the observed stickiness occurs on commitment loans
that cannot be symptomatic of rationing of this pool of borrowers,
since they are contractually protected from rationing. Similarly, the
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portion of stickiness that is due to negative rate premia cannot reflect
equilibrium credit rationing, which requires a nonnegative expected
profit on each loan. The near-equality of stickiness on commitment
and noncommitment loans casts additional doubt on whether information problems are major causes of stickiness, given the evidence
in the literature that commitment loans are relatively safe and are
likely associated with relatively few information problems. In addition, the finding that loan rate premia generally do not decrease in
response to alternative measures of credit market tightness also casts
doubts on whether the observed stickiness is symptomatic of credit
rationing. I?
Proportions Test Results

Tables 4 and 5 give the results for the proportions tests using real
and nominal Treasury rates, respectively. The dependent variables
are log-odds ratios (In[Y/(l - Y)]) for the three important loan characteristics, COMMIT, COLLAT, and FLOAT. The exogenous variables are the same as those in the stickiness tests, except that all loan
variables are size-duration weighted and no interaction terms are
specified. Column I of tables 4 and 5 shows the regressions for the
probabilities that a dollar-year of loans will be made under commitment as functions of real and nominal rates, respectively; column 2
of both tables adds the CRUNCH variable. As discussed above,
if credit rationing is an important macroeconomic phenomenon,
then it is a virtual necessary condition that the proportion of new
loans issued under commitment be substantially higher when rates
are high. As shown in the bottom section of column 1 in table 4,
a doubling of real rates yields a .069 increase in the log-odds ratio
In[COMMIT/(1 - COMMIT)). As also shown, this translates into an
increase in the probability of COMMIT of 1.7 percent when evaluated at the mean probability of COMMIT of 49.7 percent. 18 Note
17 It is interesting to note that the type of stickiness found here does not appear to
carryover to corporate bond rates, suggesting that bank loan rates may be special in
this regard. Lamy and Thompson (1988) found that the rate premium on primary
issue corporate bonds increased rather than decreased with Treasury rates in a model
in which risk (as measured by bond ratings) was controlled for and interacted with
changes in Treasury rates. Their procedure is similar to our interactions between loan
contract features and TRATE.
18 The change in probability from changing exogenous variables in a logit equation
is given by
exp(Lo + AL)
P -P P
1
0 - 1 + exp(Lo + AL)
0'

where PI and Po are the new and initial probabilities, Lo is the log-odds ratio In[Po/(l Pol, and AL is the predicted change in the log-odds ratio from changing the exogenous
variables.
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TABLE 4
GROUPED LO(:!'1' REGRESSIONS OF THE PROBAIlILiTIES OF DIFFERENT LOAN CONTRACT TER~1S ON REAL !1\TEREST RATES AND C01\TROL VARIABLES

In[COMMIT/
(I - COMMIT)]

In[COMMIT/
COMMIT)]

(I -

In[ciJLLAT/
(I - COLLA!,)]

In[COLLAT/
(I - COLLAr)]

In[FLOAT/
FLOAT)]

(I -

In[FLOAT/
(I - FLOAT)]

--~----<-.----~,-".

/-

1-

Cocfhcicnt
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COMMIT
COLLA'!'
FLOAT
II'

Coefficient

(I)

VARIABLE

TRATER
TRATER2
CRUNCH

Statistic

-2.H4D*
65.5894**

.0464
.2896**
.12

....
oCJ)

Statistic

-_ _------

(2)

-2.04
5.90

1.05
7.55

-.9288
61.3072**
- .139:3**
.0711
.3019**
.12

Statistic

Cocfftcicnl

1.66
7.85

Statistic

(:ocffkicnt

Statistic

(4)

(5)

-4.2401**
153(;77

-3.76
1.31

-6.1881**
19.8048
.2553**

-5.36
1.69
7.70

.- 10.2090**
83.9995**

-8.23
6.59

.1l31 **

2.97

.1195**

3.15

.0826*
.8240'*

17.59

.4397**
.17

I-

Coefficient

Statistic

----~-----.--

(3)

-.85
5.49
-1.28

I-

/-

1Coefflci{~nt
..

13.38

.109:\**
.18

2.05

(6)
----------11.2191**
86.1415**
.132:3**

-8.83
6.78
3.64

.0818*
.7988**

2.03
16.87

12.40
.09

.09

Simulated Effc<.:lS of an Increase in Credit Markel Tightness:
Predicted Chan"e in Dependent Variable and I-Statistic from a Doubling of TRA TER from Its Mean (from .0250 to .(500)

00

.0694**

6.19

.0917**

7.43

- .0772*'

- 6.50

-.1176"

-9.08

- .0077**

-7.56

-.1184*'

-8.39

Change in the Probability of the Category at Its Mean from a Doubling of TRATER
.0\73

- .0193

.022U

-- .02-11

- .0293

- .0296

Predicted Change in Dependent Variable and I-Statistic from a Credit Crunch (CRUNCH)
I :~93"

Change ill the Probability of rill'

- .0348

,2553**

- ·1.28
Catq~ory

7.70

.1323**

3.64

at Its Mean from a Credit CrUll<:h

.0627

.0330

;\;on",---Fa<. b ob~er\'ation n~prcs(:Ilt~ till' ~i/.{·-dlll "lion weighted t<Tm~ for a hank-date (Olllhinatioll. E,ICh dependent \rari<lblt~ is IIIII/( I - Y)l, where Y i:. the sizc-ciur'-\lion weighted proportion
of IClam willi the :-.pcdfi<.~d contract l{~rlll.\. :\umucr (If ohservations is 12,67H. Illt('rn'l)t~ Wi'r(' indudcd for ('.u.:it bank in the sample. and tlH~ U'2's rcllcct the proportion of' variance explained <tftcr
thc~c illlt'r("l'pt~, AI~() indwlcd but lIot shown an' the cOlltrol \'ari;lbk!'. I.:,\SIZE, L',nt.:RATIO~, DEYfA:\D, OVER:,\ICHT, Sl:\GFAM, MULTIFAM. NO~RES, L:\BA~KASSETS,
(;I(I'(;RO\\'TII. c:-;nll'l.()Y. TnIE. and TI~IE2.
>£< Stmislically signilicanl at the 5- percent le\'eI. tW(H.ideci.
** Statislically ~ignifi(alll at tin.' I percent level, two-sided.

TABLE 5
GROUPED LOGIT REGRESSIONS OF THE PROBABILITIES OF DIFFERENT LOAN CONTRACT TERMS
ON NOMINAL INTEREST RATES AND CONTROL VARIABLES

In[COMMITI
(1 - COMMIT)]

In[COMMITI
(1 - COMMIT)]
Coefficient
VARIABLE
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TRATEN
TRATEN2
CRUNCH

o

COMMIT
COLLAT
FLOAT
R2

tStatistic

Coefficient

tStatistic

-12.4111*53.8996*'

-6.03
6.58

-12.1075*'
54.9265**
-.0857'

-5.87
6.70
-2.55

.0814
.2832"
.12

1.83
7.38

.0955'
.2864**
.12

2.13
7.47

O'l

In[COLLATI
(1 - COLLAT)]

tCoefficient

Statistic

Coefficient

tStatistic

In[FLOATI
(1 - FLOAT)]
Coefficient

(4)

(3)

(2)

(1)

In[COLLATI
(1 - COLLAT)]

tStatistic

Coefficient

(5)

tStatistic

(6)

2.0088
-17.6335*

1.03
-2.25

1.7832
-24.7333*'
.3005**

.92
-3.14
8.59

-9.3174-*
40.6003**

-4.25
4.64

.1119"

2.94

.1153**

3.04

.0894'
.8828**

2.21
18.81

14.28

.4486**
.18

13.75

.4663'*
.17

In[FLOATI
(1 - FLOAT)]

.09

-9.2991"
40.9712"
-.0169
.0900'
.8858'*

-4.24
4.67
-.44
2.22
18.68

.09

Simulated Effects of an Increase in Credit Market Tightness:
Predicted Change in Dependent Variable and t-Statistic from Increasing TRATEN from Its Mean (.0859) by .0250

<.0

-.0451**

-3.13

- .0324*

-2.13

-.0332*

-2.16

-.0309

-1.91

- .0365**

- 2.74

-.0771**

-5.46

Change in the PrObability of the Category at Its Mean from Increasing TRATEN by .0250
-.0113

-.0081

-.0083

-.0077

- .0091

-.0193

Predicted Change in Dependent Variable and I-Statistic from a Credit Crunch (CRUNCH)
-.0857*

-2.55

.3005'*

8.59

-.0169

Change in the Probability of the Category at Its Mean from a Credit Crunch
-.0214
NOTE.-See note to table 4.
* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level, two-sided.
1 percent level, two-sided.

** Statistically Significant at the

.0735

-.0042

-.44
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that this 1.7 percent is effectively an estimate of the maximum effect
of a doubling of real rates, since the logit specification yields the
maximum derivatives at a 50 percent probability, with smaller effects
toward the limiting probabilities of zero and 100 percent. The
CRUNCH variable in column 2 of table 4 again goes in the opposite
direction of that predicted by rationing and actually has a larger
absolute effect (- 3.5 percent) than the doubling of real rates. Similarly, when the rate of real or nominal aggregate loan growth was
substituted for TRA TER, the predicted effect from decreasing loan
growth from the mean to zero actually reduced the probability of
COMMIT, contrary to the implications of credit rationing (not
shown). The effects of nominal rates shown in columns 1 and 2 of
table 5 show a decrease in the probability of COMMIT of about 1
percent, with both CRUNCH and nominal loan growth (not shown)
also predicting a decrease in COMMIT when markets are tight. Thus
in all but one of six cases, the COMMIT probability moves in the
opposite direction of that predicted by rationing theory, and the one
exception is a very small increase.
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships between the COMMIT/NOKCOMMIT ratio and Treasury rates over time. The solid lines in the
figure connect the size-duration weighted averages of the COMMITI
KONCOMMIT ratio for each time period, and the broken lines connect the weighted averages of TRA TER and TRATEN. The ratio
is negatively correlated with both real and nominal rates over the
1979: 4-1982 : 4 period and is either positively correlated or uncorrelated with open-market rates for the remainder of the sample. This
runs counter to the empirical predictions of the credit rationing hypothesis since cyclical rationing would be most likely to appear during
the volatile period in which real interest rates went up and down
from their sample maximum levels. However, it should be noted that
when the sample was split into early and late subsamples and the
regressions were rerun (not shown), the computed effects of TRA TE
on COMMIT/NONCOMMIT remained about the same as those reported in tables 4 and 5, apparently because of changes in the control
variables. 19
For additional evidence, the COMMIT regressions in tables 4 and
5 were also rerun using as dependent variables the quantities of commitment and noncommitment loans in place of the log-odds ratios
(not reported in the tables). Both types of loans were found to be
increasing in the interest rate, suggesting that both commitment and
noncommitment borrowers are able to obtain funding when rates are
19 The fact that the results hold up by subsample also lessens concern over the
possible non stationarity of the COMMIT ratio over the late subsample.
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FIG. 2.-Ratio of commitment to noncommitment bank loans and Treasury rates of
the same duration (1977:1-1988:2): a, real Treasury rates; b, nominal Treasury rates.

high. Thus even if some noncommitment borrower pools are subject
to rationing, these data suggest that other noncommitment borrower
pools increase their borrowing, more than offsetting any rationing
effect in the aggregate. 20
The log·odds and quantity COMMIT regressions together suggest
that information-based, equilibrium credit rationing, if it exists, may
be relatively small and economically insignificant. The one small in20 The log·odds logit formulation is still preferred to using the quantities as dependent variables because the logit form automatically controls for any variables that affect.
the overall level of lending by the bank.
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crease in the commitment proportion from a doubling of real interest
rates is counteracted by the opposite findings when nominal interest
rates, CRUNCH, or loan growth is specified and by the finding that
the quantity of noncommitment loans actually increases with both
real and nominal rates. In addition, as discussed above, there are two
other related explanations that are just as likely to account for the
single small commitment proportion increase. First, when market
rates are high, borrowers who have both commitment and noncommitment funding capacities may switch from noncommitment to
commitment sources to avoid rationing. Second, borrowers may take
out more commitment contracts when rates are rising to avoid rationing. Thus the one small increase in the commitment proportion
when real open-market rates increase may indicate that Stiglitz and
Weiss-type information problems are operative, but the extent to
which they result in rationing or just more commitment protection
from rationing is not identified.
The results and conclusions drawn here are somewhat in conflict
with those of Sofianos et al. (1990), but this conflict is likely due to
methodological differences and the fact that they used only aggregate
data. Sofianos et al. ran vector autoregressive models of the dollar
stocks (as opposed to new flows) of commitment and noncommitment
loans aggregated from a sample of banks. They found that with lags
of the interest rate included in the regressions, the coefficients of the
lagged money stock were statistically significant in predicting (i.e.,
Granger-caused) noncommitment loans but were not statistically significant in predicting (i.e., did not Granger-cause) commitment loans.
Sofia nos et al. took this as evidence that a rationing channel acts on
noncommitment loans but not on commitment loans. In subsequent
runs provided by those authors, however, the sum of the lagged coefficients of the money stock was positive and statistically significant for
commitment loans and negative and insignificant for noncom mitment loans. These additional results conflict with a conclusion of
credit rationing since it is noncommitment loans rather than commitment loans that should increase with the money stock for a given
interest rate under rationing. To investigate these implications further, we reran our log-odds COMMIT models, adding lagged
changes in the real money stock as exogenous variables (not shown
in the tables). The sums of the money lags were positive and significant when real interest rates were included as regressors (positive
and insignificant when nominal rates were included), again running
contrary to the predictions of credit rationing.
Columns 3 and 4 of tables 4 and 5 show that the probability of
collateralized borrowing decreases by about 1-2 percent when openmarket rates increase by 2.5 percent. Again, CRUNCH has the oppo-
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site effect of market rates. These findings are consistent with the
stickiness results, which suggested that even after the pledging process, the remaining information problems are greater than average
for the pools of borrowers in which collateral is pledged. These results also suggest that to the extent that rationing occurs, secured
borrowers are more often rationed than unsecured borrowers. However, rerunning the regressions using the quantities of secured and
unsecured loans as the dependent variables in place of the log-odds
ratio (not shown in the tables) indicated that both secured and unsecured loans tend to increase when rates are high. This suggests that
the rationing of secured borrowers, if it occurs, may not have much
macroeconomic significance since other secured borrowers apparently make up the difference by increasing their borrowing.
The final columns in tables 4 and 5 show the regressions for the
probability of FLOAT. The results show a small decrease in the
FLOAT proportion of about 1-3 percent when open-market rates
increase by 2.5 percent. This provides some weak evidence for the
implicit interest rate insurance hypothesis to the extent that a fixedrate loan is a superior vehicle to a floating-rate loan for providing
this insurance. Rerunning the regressions using the quantities of
floating-rate and fixed-rate loans as dependent variables (not shown
in the tables) yielded a prediction that both types of loans increase
with open-market rates.
Overall, the proportions tests suggest that credit rationing of commercial bank loan customers is not likely to be an important macroeconomic phenomenon. The proportion of new loans issued under
commitment does not increase substantially when real rates rise and
actually decreases when most of the measures of credit market tightness increase, despite the fact that rationing can occur only by decreasing noncommitment loans. Moreover, the slight increase in the
commitment proportion in the real rate regression appears to come
about not because of a decrease in noncommitment loans, but simply
because noncommitment loans increase by less than commitment
loans do when interest rates increase. Increases in the money stock
for a given interest rate also tend to increase commitment loans more
than noncommitment loans, again contrary to the predictions of
credit rationing.
Finally, we note that both the stickiness and proportions tests were
subjected to a number of robustness checks beyond those reported
above. The regressions were rerun using data from 1977 through
1983, leaving off the 1984-88 period, when it is generally agreed
that rationing would be less severe or nonexistent. The results were
qualitatively unaffected by this data omission. The stickiness regressions were rerun using the 3-month Treasury rate for every loan
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rather than the comparable Treasury rate for the loan, and most of
the results were similar. The stickiness regressions were also rerun
with the TRA TE variable interacted with LNSIZE, and with dummy
variables for whether rates were increasing or decreasing. These interactions did not change the results qualitatively.21 The proportions
regressions for the three key contract terms were also rerun with
each of the other two contract terms excluded as regressors, with no
qualitative change in results.
IV.

Conclusions

This paper has examined the empirical significance of informationbased, equilibrium credit rationing of commercial bank loan customers by focusing on specific elements of the commercial loan contract.
Such an analysis is suggested by the extant theories of credit rationing, which offer a variety of testable implications vis-a-vis specific
loan contract features, particularly commitments. Earlier empirical
studies have been unable to examine these implications because information on loan contract features has generally been unavailable.
Our major empirical results and their implications are summarized
in table 6. As in earlier studies, our results suggest that the commercial loan rate is sticky with respect to open-market rates, consistent
with rationing. In contrast to other studies, however, use of the data
on the key loan contract terms suggests that most of the stickiness
does not reflect credit rationing. Nearly half of the observed loan rate
stickiness occurs on loans made to commitment borrowers, who are
contractually protected from rationing. Some of the remaining stickiness involves loans whose rate premia actually become negative when
open-market rates are high, which also cannot be symptomatic of
equilibrium credit rationing. Also in contrast to other studies, we are
able to verify the robustness of our results using alternative measures
of credit market tightness.
The most compelling evidence on rationing concerns the proportion of new loans made under commitment. Rationing requires that
the fraction of new loans under commitment rise when open-market
rates are high, since noncommitment borrowers are rationed and
commitment borrowers are not. Our results suggest that this phenomenon does not occur to any great extent, and, in fact, the commitment ratio decreases with most of our measures of credit market
tightness. The data also indicate that all types of commercial loans,
21 The TR-L~SIZE interaction had a positive coefficient, consistent with the hypothesis that smaller loans may have more information problems that are reflected in a
larger degree of rate stickiness.

Copyright © 1992. All rights reserved.

TABLE 6
SUMMARY OF MAJOR EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Implication

Result
A. Stickiness Tests
1. General stickiness. Loan rate premia
over Treasury rates of equal duration decrease substantially with open-market rates
2. Commitment loan rates nearly as
sticky as noncommitment rates. Also,
some of the observed stickiness occurs on loans with negative premia
over risk-free rates

3. Fixed-rate loans have much stickier
rates than floating-rate loans
4. Secured loans have slightly stickier
rates than unsecured loans
5. Loan rate premia generally do not
decrease with other measures of
credit market tightness (CRUNCH
or reduced aggregate loan growth)
6. Loan rate stickiness prevails over all
risk class quintiles (as measured by
rate premia)

Consistent with credit rationing, implicit interest rate insurance, or recontracting with troubled borrowers
Much of the stickiness cannot be explained by credit rationing since commitment borrowers cannot be rationed, and negative premia are
inconsistent with equilibrium rationing theories
Consistent with implicit interest rate insurance hypothesis
Consistent with credit rationing since
collateral is more often required
from riskier, more informationproblematic borrower pools
Credit rationing, if it occurs, does not
play an important role during periods of overall credit market
tightness
Inconsistent with Riley (1987) version
of credit rationing, in which only the
observably riskiest pools are rationed.

B. Proportions Tests

1. Commitment proportion of new
loans does not increase substantially
with real open-market rates and decreases with nominal rates and other
measures of market tightness
2. The quantities of both new commitment loans and new noncom mitment loans increase with openmarket rates

3. Commitment proportion of new
loans increases with lagged money
stock, given interest rates
4. Collateral proportion of new loans
decreases slightly with open-market
rates, but quantities of both new secured and new unsecured loans increase
5. Fixed-rate proportion of new loans
increases slightly with market rates

Inconsistent with credit rationing having macroeconomic significance because only non commitment borrowers can be rationed
Inconsistent with credit rationing having macroeconomic significance. If
some noncommitment borrowers are
rationed, others increase borrowing
and make up for it
Inconsistent with credit rationing,
which predicts that money channel
(Le., rationing) affects only noncommitment loans
Consistent with greater relative rationing of riskier borrowers, but others increase borrowing, and make up
for it
Consistent with implicit interest rate insurance hypothesis
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including noncommitment loans, tend to increase in quantity during
periods of high interest rates. This suggests that to the extent that
some borrowers may be rationed, others take their places and receive
bank loans. Taken together, the results in this paper do not rule
out the existence of information-based equilibrium credit rationing
of commercial bank borrowers, but they make it difficult to argue
that such rationing constitutes an important macroeconomic phenomenon.
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